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Taxing E-Commerce in the Post- Wayfair World
David Gamage, Darien Shanske, & Adam Thimmesch*
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's recent decision in South Dakota v. Wayfair is
perhaps the most important state and local tax decision in recent decades.'
Since the 1990's, internet-based electronic commerce (or, "e-commerce")
has exploded in both magnitude and importance. 2 However, state
governments have faced serious obstacles in their efforts to include ecommerce transactions in the bases of their sales and use taxes. The
primary source of these obstacles was the precedent from an earlier
Supreme Court case decided in 1992 - Quill Corp. v. North Dakota.3 By
overruling the Quill precedent, the Wayfair case has begun a new era for
state taxation of e-commerce.
The Court's ruling in Wayfair was very narrow, holding only that the
physical-presence precedent from Quill is no longer the governing
standard for purposes of determining when a taxpayer has the "substantial
nexus" required under the Court's Complete Auto formulation. That
limited holding leaves many questions unanswered.
In this essay, we analyze many of the key questions that will arise from
the Wayfair decision. As part of our analysis, we offer advice to state
governments about how they should reform their sales and use tax regimes
in response to the Wayfair decision.
Specifically, we advise that state governments should consider: (1)
simplifying their sales-and-use-tax systems, along with potentially joining
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South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018).

2.

David Gamage & Devin J. Heckman, A Better Way Forward for State Taxation of E-

Commerce, 92 B.U. L. REV. 483, 484 (2012).
3.
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 309-19 (1992).
4.
Wavfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099; Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
5.
This essay is a revised, integrated, and elaborated version of pre-publication drafts of three prior
essays. Those prior essays are: Darien Shanske, David Gamage & Adam Thimmesch, Wayfair:
Marketplaces and Foreign Vendors, 90 STATE TAX NOTES Ill (2018); Adam Thimmesch, Darien
Shanske & David Gamage, Wayfair: Sales Tax Formalism and Income Tax Nexus, 89 STATE TAX
NOTES 975 (2018); Adam Thimmesch, Darien Shanske & David Gamage, Wayfair: SubstantialNexus
and Undue Burden, 89 STATE TAX NOTES 447 (2018).
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the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement ("SSUTA") if they have
not already done so, (2) offering full and adequate reimbursement for
compliance costs, especially for smaller vendors, (3) offering free
compliance software and immunity for vendors who properly rely on such
software, (4) either ensuring that their sales-and-use-tax statutes impose
substantive tax liabilities in the same manner as does South Dakota's
statute or else continuing their reliance on the historic formalism by
requiring remote vendors to collect and remit use taxes rather than sales
taxes, (5) ensuring that any attempts to expand corporate income tax nexus
based on the Wayfair decision incorporate de minimis thresholds in a
similar manner as with our recommendations for expanding sales-and-use
tax nexus, (6) applying their new sales-and-use-tax nexus standards to the
major marketplaces in addition to vendors selling directly, and (7) taking
steps to alleviate possible concerns about in-state citizens shifting to
purchasing from foreign vendors.
I. ANALYZING THE WAYFAIR DECISION
It is helpful to begin by discussing the actual decision in Wayfair. The
majority opinion was written by Justice Anthony Kennedy, who invited
the case three years earlier in his concurring opinion in DMA4 v. Broh 1.6
Kennedy started the majority opinion with a review of the development of
the Supreme Court's dormant Commerce Clause doctrine since the 1800s
and noted that the Court's tax-specific precedents had been animated by its
approach in its regulatory cases. The opinion started with a clear statement
regarding the majority's view of the merit of the physical presence rule,
calling the rule "flawed on its own terms." 7 The opinion further stated that
it was not a "necessary interpretation" of the substantial nexus
requirement, that it created market distortions rather than preventing them,
and that is was "the sort of arbitrary, formalistic [rule] that the Court's
modern Commerce Clause precedents disavow." 8
The Court recognized that the nexus requirement was akin to the Due
Process minimum contacts requirement and said that, although the two

6.
7.
8.

Direct Mktg. Ass'n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1134-35 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2092.
Id.
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"may not be identical or coterminous... there are significant parallels." 9
Incorporating the Quill Court's due process analysis by reference, "o the
Court then plainly stated that "[p]hysical presence is not necessary to
create a substantial nexus."" With that, Quill was dead.
The remainder of the Court's opinion focused on justifying that
decision. The Court discussed the distortionary impact of the physical
presence rule, the Court's general move away from formalism in its
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the poor fit of a physical
presence rule in the modern economy, that rule's impact on states and our
federal structure, and why stare decisis did not compel upholding Quill.
The Court also addressed the concern that removing the physical
presence rule would result in the imposition of undue compliance burdens
on vendors engaging in interstate commerce, calling those burdens
"legitimate concerns." 2 The Court did not feel that those concerns merited
retaining the physical-presence rule, though, pointing to the availability of
software and Congressional intervention "if it deems it necessary and fit to
do so."' 3 The Court also noted that South Dakota's law provided a
"reasonable degree of protection" for smaller vendors.1 4 The Court pointed
to the law's sales and transaction thresholds, its prospective application,
and South Dakota's membership in the SSUTA. It also referenced other
potential avenues for smaller vendors to get relief from state laws that
overreach using "other theories," including the potential application of its
Pike-balancing test5-something two of us have argued for in other fora.' 6
The concluding section of the majority opinion gave some insight into
the future of the nexus requirement, but not much. The Court seems to

9.

Id at 2093.

10.
Id. ("Quill itself recognized that '[t]he requirements of due process are met irrespective of a
corporation's lack of physical presence in the taxing State.' (citing Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504

U.S. 298, 308 (1992)).
11.
Id
12.
Id at 2098.
13. Id.
14. Id
15. Id at 2098-99.
16.
Adam B. Thimmesch., A Unifying Approach to Nexus Under the Dormant Commerce Clause,
116 MICH. L. REV. ONLLVE 101 (2018), http://michiganlawreview.org/a-unifying-approach-to-nexusunder-the-dormant-commerce-clause/; Amicus Curiae Brief of Four United States Senators Supporting

Petitioner, South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018) (No. 17-494), 2018 WL 1202848
[hereinafter Brief of Four U.S. Senators]..

V.
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have offered a new standard for nexus-or at least a new formulation of
the standard-stating that "nexus is established when the taxpayer [or
collector] 'avails itself of the substantial privilege of carrying on business'
in that urisdiction."1 7 The Court cited Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of
Valdez, for that proposition. However, Polar Tankers involved a local
personal property tax that was struck down as violating the Tonnage
Clause and does not provide much guidance.' 9 This is especially because
that case involved ships that were undeniably present in the taxing
20
jurisdiction. Nexus would have been established even under Quill.
The Wayfair Court's application of the nexus standard, whatever the
formulation, was also terse and provided little additional guidance. The
Court simply stated that "[h]ere, the nexus is clearly sufficient based on
both the economic and virtual contacts respondents have with the State."a
The Court found that South Dakota's economic thresholds ensured that
impacted vendors had the requisite economic contacts, and it noted that
respondents were "large, national companies that undoubtedly maintain an
extensive virtual presence." 22 Those conclusions were enough for the
majority to determine that the substantial nexus requirement was met on
the facts presented.
The Court then again took care to point out that "some other principle in
the Court's Commerce Clause doctrine might invalidate" the South Dakota
law, but it declined to opine on that issue because it had "not been litigated
or briefed., 2 3 The Court did, however, again note the fact that South
Dakota's law had "several features that appear designed to prevent
,,24
discrimination against or undue burdens upon interstate commerce.
Those features included (1) its de minimis safe harbor, (2) its
prospectivity, and (3) South Dakota's adoption of the SSUTA, which
25
brings with it reduced administrative and compliance costs for vendors.

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099 (quoting Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 557 U.S. 1 (2009)).
557 U.S. 1 (2009).
Id. at 6.
Id. at 5.
Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Justice Kennedy's majority opinion was joined by Justices Thomas,
Ginsburg, Alito, and Gorsuch. Both Justices Thomas and Gorsuch also
penned concurring opinions. Justice Thomas repeated his standard
26
objection to the Court's entire dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.
Justice Gorsuch was not far behind in his critique, but rather than casting
doubt on the entire doctrine, he merely expressed reservation with it and
noted that his broader concerns were "questions for another day." 27
Chief Justice John Roberts wrote a dissent, with which Justices Breyer,
Sotomayor, and Kagan joined.28 That opinion did not defend the physical
presence rule-it indeed called the Court's prior cases that had established
that rule "wrongly decided"-but reasoned that any change to that rule
should be done by Congress given the potentially immense economic
consequences.29 The Chief Justice argued that the principle of stare decisis
should have applied especially forcefully in the case and that the Court
should have retained Quill on that basis.
The majority opinion in Wayfair did one thing very clearly-it
eliminated the physical presence rule as the relevant test for determining
when a taxpayer (or tax collector) has a substantial nexus within the
Complete Auto framework. Beyond that limited holding, the Court's
opinion did little else, which leaves a number of questions for states,
vendors, and those interested in state tax policy. Two of the most
immediate questions directly raised by the holding are: (1) what now
constitutes substantial nexus, and (2) when now do state statutes unduly
burden interstate commerce.
A. What Constitutes SubstantialNexus?
The first major question arising from the Wayfair decision, from both
doctrinal and practical perspectives, is what nexus standard applies postWayfair. The Court offered two threads from which to draw guidance. The
first was its citation to Polar Tankers and its statement that nexus is

26.

Id at 2100 (Thomas, J., Concurring).

27.

Id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring).

28.
29.
30.

Id at 2101 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 2101-05.
Id. at 2102.
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created when one "avails [oneself] of the substantial privilege of carrying
on business" in a jurisdiction. 31 That standard, though, could be construed
as coterminous with the Due Process purposeful-availment standard and
does not appear to require much beyond making sales to in-state
customers.3 2
The second hint of a nexus standard was the Court's reference to
"economic and virtual contacts." Here is the key paragraph:
Here, the nexus is clearly sufficient based on both the economic and
virtual contacts respondents have with the State. The Act applies only to
sellers that deliver more than $100,000 of goods or services into South
Dakota or engage in 200 or more separate transactions for the delivery of
goods and services into the State on an annual basis. S. B. 106, §1. This
quantity of business could not have occurred unless the seller availed itself
of the substantial privilege of carrying on business in South Dakota. And
respondents are large, national companies that undoubtedly maintain an
extensive virtual presence. Thus, the substantial nexus requirement of
Complete Auto is satisfied in this case.33
The first sentence of this paragraph suggests that two inquiries are
relevant to nexus: (1) a taxpayer's economic returns from a state and (2)
its activities directed toward a state. 34 The second and third sentences of
this paragraph suggest that the South Dakota thresholds require sufficient
"economic contacts" for substantial nexus. The fourth sentence,
emphasizing the size of respondents, focused on the so-called "virtual
contacts" that large, national e-commerce vendors create through their
extensive marketing and web presences.

31.
Id. at 2099 (majority opinion) (quoting Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 557 U.S. 1, 11
(2009))
32.
WALTER HELLERSTEIN ET AL., STATE TAXATION ¶ 19.02[3][d][ii], Westlaw (database updated
August 2018) ("by emphasizing the close affinity between Due Process Clause and Commerce Clause
nexus standards, the Court effectively brought an end to the view, first introduced by Quill, that there
are significant practical differences between the two"); Richard E. Kaye, Annotation, Internet Web site
activities of nonresident person or corporation as conferring personaljurisdiction under long-arm
statutes and due process clause, 81 A.L.R.5th 41 §5 (2000).

33.

Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099.

34.
Evaluating nexus by reference to those two factors is similar to how state courts and legislatures
have evaluated economic nexus for purposes of state corporate income taxes.
See Adam B.

Thimmesch, The Illusory PromiseofEconomic Nexus, 13 FLA. TAX REv. 157, 176-84 (2012).
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What this paragraph does not do is to address precisely when small
sellers have a substantial nexus. What if a small seller has exactly 200
sales, worth $20,000? Given this uncertainty, our advice for states as to
nexus at the moment would be, at a minimum, to put in place thresholds
similar to South Dakota's. As noted above, the South Dakota statute
imposes tax collection obligations only on vendors who deliver more than
$100,000 of goods or services into South Dakota or who engage in 200 or
more transactions with South Dakota customers-both determined on an
annual basis.35 Indeed, for states that want to be better insulated from
challenges from small sellers, and likely at minimal revenue loss, we
would suggest adopting higher thresholds (i.e., thresholds more deferential
to small sellers) than South Dakota's. This goes especially for non-SSUTA
states.
B. When Do State Statutes Unduly Burden Interstate Commerce?
The Court's opinion seems to leave more room for vendors to challenge
state impositions as unduly burdening interstate commerce than for
vendors to challenge whether they have nexus with a state. Such a
challenge would presumably be evaluated based on Pike balancing.
Several passages from the majority opinion imply this, although these
passages are somewhat perplexing. After all, Pike balancing has been
previously understood as the backup test for economic regulations-not
for taxes.3 6
Pike involved a challenge to an Arizona statute regulating the labelling
of cantaloupes shipped from the state. 37 That statute was challenged as
violating the dormant Commerce Clause because of the costs that it
imposed on businesses that shipped products out of the state.
In
evaluating that claim, the Court stated that:

35.
See supra text accompanying note 33.
36.
See Mark L. Mosley, The Path Out of a Quagmire: A Better Standardfor Assesssing State and
Local Taxes Under the Negative Commerce Clause, 58 TAX LAW. 729, 739 (2005) ("The Court
appears to have recognized that Pike balancing has no place in taxation cases because it has never

explicitly applied Pike to such a case").
37.
Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 138 (1970).
38.
Id. at 140.
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Although the criteria for determining the validity of state statutes
affecting interstate commerce have been variously stated, the general rule
that emerges can be phrased as follows: where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on
interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits. 3 9
The result of Pike is that the Court has generally applied a balancing test
to non-discriminatory state regulations that impact interstate commerce.
There is one notable exception, of course. The Court has evaluated state
regulations that take the form of taxes or tax-collection obligations under
Complete Auto instead.
This is not to say that Pike and Complete Auto do not overlap. They do.
The Quill Court even implicitly recognized that the nexus requirement
serves a Pike-like function. 4 0 The Court analyzed the physical-presence
nexus rule in terms of undue burdens. The Court just expressly declined to
require "case-by-case" balancing as is required under Pike and instead
determined to protect against undue burdens by maintaining its "brightline rule.',4
Given this history, Pike balancing and the substantial-nexus requirement
have been understood as being different, and many of the amici who
argued for Pike balancing did so specifically as an alternative to the
Complete Auto framework.42 The Wayfair Court's suggestion that both the
nexus test of Complete Auto and the balancing test of Pike could apply
was therefore something a bit new.
In short, the Court could just have applied a balancing test in the context
of substantial nexus. Instead, the implication of the majority's reasoning
is that Pike balancing will be applied as an additional test. We do not
know of a precedent for using Pike as an additional text on top of
Complete Auto. In any event, the majority opinion clearly left open the
possibility for a Pike balancing type of challenge. The opinion even

39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 142.
See Thimmesch, supra note 16, at 106-08.
Quill, 504 U.S. at 314-15.
See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2102; Brief of Four US Senators, supra note 16, at 6, 13 (arguing that

the "Complete Auto test [] is not the correct rubric" but Pike balancing is.).
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(helpfully) explained the features of South Dakota's law that, if duplicated
by other states, would make those challenges less likely to succeed. Recall
that the Court twice referred to the fact that (1) South Dakota thresholds
provided a small seller safe harbor; (2) that South Dakota's imposition
applied prospectively only; and (3) that South Dakota was a SSUTA state
and had thus simplified its system in ways to reduce compliance costs for
vendors. States that can replicate those factors should take comfort that
their statutes are permissible. States that fail them might need to be more
concerned.
Some discussions of the Wayfair decision seem to suggest that states
must conform to these features of South Dakota's statute before they can
require remote vendors to collect tax. 43 We think that reads far too much
into the opinion. The Court certainly did not make these features into
requirements. Instead, the Wayfair decision held that these features suffice
to insulate states from judicial rebuke. Further, even in "non-conforming
states," it seems highly unlikely that a state statute would be overturned on
Pike-balancing absent low thresholds or retroactive application.
Nevertheless, Pike is difficult to apply, and we think states should be wary
of pressing the issue. Better to avoid costly litigation, especially when the
revenue to be gained from smaller vendors is likely small.
Therefore, as to Pike balancing, our advice is that non-SSUTA states
should seek to reduce compliance costs for out of state vendors the best
that they can. These states should find ways to simplify their sales-tax
systems within local constraints, offer vendor reimbursement for
compliance costs, 45 and consider offering free compliance software and
immunizing vendors who rely upon it. Again, we do not think that the
Court's opinion requires these actions, just that these actions would be
legally advisable and are sensible in any event from a policy perspective.

43.
Joseph Bishop-Henchman, Post-Wayfair Options for States, TAX FOUNDATION (Aug. 29,
2018), https://taxfoundation.org/post-wayfair-options-for-states/ (providing an analysis of whether
states are "compliant" with the Wajfair "checklist").
44.
We have previously written that retroactively imposed liabilities could potentially violate the
dormant Commerce Clause. See Adam Thimmesch, Darien Shanske, & David Gamage, Wayfair and
the Retroactivity of ConstitutionalHoldings, 88 STATE TAX NOTES 511 (2018).
45.
One of us discussed this first approach in a prior article. See Gamage & Heckman, supra note 2.
46.
Two of us discussed this approach in a prior essay: Andrew J. Haile, David Gamage, & Darien
Shanske, A PotentialGame Changer in E-Commerce Taxation, 67 STATE TAX NOTES 747 (2013).
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II. DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE WAYFAIR DECISION
Beyond the direct effect of replacing Quill's physical-presence rule, the
reasoning in the Wayfair decision may potentially impact doctrines related
to the taxation of interstate e-commerce in at least a couple of other,
potentially important, ways. Specifically, the decision's reasoning may
impact (1) the fornalism that had previously governed interstate sales and
use taxation, and (2) the doctrines related to governing nexus for state
corporate income taxes.
With regard to sales tax formalism, we advise state governments to
either make sure that their statutes impose substantive tax liabilities in the
same manner as does South Dakota's statute or else continue to rely on the
historic formalism by requiring remote vendors to collect and remit use
taxes (rather than sales taxes). With regard to income tax nexus, we
advise state governments to make sure that any attempts to expand
corporate income tax nexus based on the Wayfair decision incorporate de
minimis thresholds (similar to those we recommend above in our
discussion of expanding sales and use tax nexus).
A. The Implications of Wayfair For Sales Tax Formalism
The Wayfair Court's reversal of Quill was consistent with the Court's
general trend away from formalism in its dormant Commerce Clause
cases, and the Court partially justified its decision on that ground.4 7 But
the physical-presence rule was not the only historic formalism implicated
in Wayfair. Since the 1940s, the Court has prevented states from imposing
their sales taxes on transactions that are completed out of state. 48
Nevertheless, the Court allows states to impose economically equivalent
"use taxes" on the in-state consumption of the purchased items. 49 That
additional tax could result in double taxation or discrimination against
interstate commerce, but states have structured their sales and use tax
systems to avoid those results. States both (1) set their use tax rates at or
below their sales-tax rates to avoid any discrimination; and (2) provide

47.
48.
49.

South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2094-95 (2018).
McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944).
Gen. Trading Co. v. Iowa, 322 U.S. 335 (1944).
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their residents with credits against their use taxes for any sales taxes that
they actually paid on the purchase of the taxable good or service. The
latter ensures that residents pay tax at least equivalent to the tax that would
be owed if they had made the purchase in state. The resulting system is
economically equivalent to destination-sourcing the sales tax, but states
must abide by this formal structure.
The source of this formalism is the Court's 1944 decision in McLeod v.
Dilworth.5 0 That case involved a challenge to an Arkansas sales tax that
applied to transactions consummated out of state but shipped to Arkansas
customers. The Court struck down that sales tax as unconstitutional
because the majority felt that allowing Arkansas to tax such a transaction
would be to allow the state "to project its powers beyond its boundaries
and to tax an interstate transaction," which conflicted with prior
conceptions of states' powers.51 The Court did, however, recognize the
broad equivalency of state sales and use taxes and it even upheld the
imposition of the latter in a case that it decided on the same day.52 The
Court reasoned that its different approach under the dormant Commerce
Clause was justified because sales and use taxes were "different in
conception" and "assessments upon different transactions." 53
The Dilworth formalism has stood since the 1940s. Yet it is now unclear
whether, and to what extent, this formalism still holds post- Wayfair. The
South Dakota statute that was challenged in Wayfair conflicted with both
Quill and Dilworth by requiring remote vendors to collect the state's sales
tax rather than its use tax.54 The litigation, however, focused only on the
Quill precedent. Neither the parties nor the Court addressed the Dilworth
issue.
It is not clear to us whether the Court consciously avoided the issue or
whether the Court just did not appreciate that aspect of the case. Justice
Kennedy's opinion did explicitly note that the South Dakota statute
imposed a sales tax collection obligation, but the reference seems to have
been more colloquial than technical. Read in its entirety, the Wayfair

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Dilworth, 322 U.S. at 327.
Id. at 330.
Gen. Trading Co., 322 U.S. at 335.
Dilworth, 322 U.S. at 330.
S. 106, 2016 Leg. Assemb., 91st Sess. (S.D. 2016).
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opinion suggests that the Court viewed the difference in the taxes as a
difference in who remits them-sales taxes being collected and remitted
by vendors and use taxes being paid directly by consumers . That
distinction is largely true, of course, but it is not the relevant substantive
distinction between the two taxes. The Dilworth Court was right. The
taxes are "different in conception" and "assessments upon different
transactions."
It may be that the Court was willing to ignore this issue because the
parties did not raise it. The majority opinion did state that "[a]ll concede
that taxing the sales in question here is lawful." 57 Perhaps that was the
Court's way of saying that the Dilworth issue had been waived, but it is
not clear. The Court did remand the case to the South Dakota courts to
resolve other, non-Quill, objections. The biggest issue flagged by the
Court in that regard was whether South Dakota's law would fail the
balancing test of Pike v. Bruce Church, but it may be that the South
Dakota statute remains vulnerable under Dilworth as well. The Court
certainly did not explicitly overrule that case in Wayfair.
The uncertainty involving this issue leads us to conclude that the better
course for states would be to continue to abide by the Dilworth formalism
and to enact their economic-nexus standards through their use-tax systems.
It seems unlikely that the Court will clarify this area of law any time soon,
if ever. Nevertheless, if states want to adopt sales-tax collection
obligations using the South Dakota model, they will need to ensure that
their statutes actually impose the tax as a substantive matter. South Dakota
law appears to do so because it is a member of the SSUTA, which sources
sales to where customers take delivery of property if they use a shipping
company to pick up their orders. States that have adopted the SSUTA

55.

South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2087 (2018). ("When a consumer purchases

goods or services, the consumer's State often imposes a sales tax. This case requires the Court to
determine when an out-of-state seller can be required to collect and remit that tax."); id at 2088
("South Dakota has a sales tax. . . Sellers are generally required to collect and remit this tax. If for
some reason the sales tax is not remitted by the seller, then in-state consumers are separately
responsible for paying a use tax at the same rate."); see also id. ("Under this Court's decisions in
Bellas Hess and Quill, South Dakota may not require a business to collect its sales tax if the business
lacks a physical presence in the State.").

56.
57.
58.

Dilworth, 322 U.S. at 330.
Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2087.
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 10-45-2, 10-45-108 (2010); S.D. ADMIN. R.

§

64:06:01:62(1) (2015);
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should therefore not have a problem with this issue, but other states might.
If they are going to impose sales-tax collection obligations, they should
ensure that their statutes operate similarly.
Ultimately, this is an issue that is easy to plan around. States can follow
the historic Dilworth formalism and require remote vendors to collect their
use taxes. However, if states want to follow South Dakota's lead, they
should ensure that their statutes actually impose sales tax on out-of-state
sales.
Though we do not think the Court meant to overrule Dilworth by
implication, this is an issue worth watching.
In our increasingly
interconnected economy, we can imagine states having good reasons to tax
(or regulate) transactions arguably entirely consummated out-of-state. 59 If
the formalism of Dilworth is no more, then the states might be able to tax
such transactions.
B. The Implications ofWayfair ForIncome Tax Nexus
On July 13, Wells Fargo CFO John Shrewsberry announced that the
company was making a $481 million adjustment to its earnings based on
the Wayfair decision.60 That adjustment was not due to the company's
potential sales-tax exposure, but rather was because some of its affiliated
entities had been relying on Quill to avoid paying income taxes in some
states. That position does not appear to have been unique to Wells Fargo,
but it was aggressive. States and taxpayers have debated whether Quill
applies to income taxes for some time, but state courts have nearly
universally held that it does not. 62 Wells Fargo apparently did not agree,

STREAMLINED SALES AND USE TAX AGREEMENT
BD., INC. 2018).

59.

§§

310, 311 (STREAMLINED SALES TAX GOVERNING

Ass'n for Accessible Meds. v. Frosh, 887 F.3d 664 (4th Cir. 2018) (striking down Maryland's

attempt to control certain drug prices because "it [] controls the price of transactions that occur wholly
outside the state.").
60.
See Andrea Muse, Wells Fargo Adjusts Income Tax Reserves Following Wayfair, TAX NOTES,
July 17, 2018, https://www.taxnotes.com/editors-pick/wells-fargo-adjusts-income-tax-reserves-followi
ng-wayfair.
61.
See id. (quoting one prominent accounting firm leader as saying that "the physical presence
standard[] has long been thought to apply for determinations of substantial nexus for state income tax
purposes...").
62.
Thimmesch, supra note 34, at 173-75.
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and technically the question was undecided because the Supreme Court
had declined to opine on the issue. Way/air left no doubt though. By
reversing Quill, the Court settled this issue.
What the Court did not settle is the same question that it left open with
respect to sales taxes-how far can states go with nexus? As we discussed
above, 63 the Court referred to its Polar Tankers opinion in stating that
''nexus is established when the taxpayer [or collector] 'avails itself of the
substantial privilege of carrying on business' in that jurisdiction."" The
Wayjair Court then analyzed respondents' nexus by reference to their
"economic and virtual contacts" with South Dakota. 65 Unfortunately, the
Court did not expand on what those tens meant or when they were
sufficient for nexus. The Court merely stated that South Dakota's
threshold amounts-$100,000 in sales or 200 transactions-were
sufficient to ensure that respondents had the required economic contacts
and that respondents' statuses as "large, national companies" meant that
they "undoubtedly maintain an extensive virtual presence." 66
The Court's limited nexus analysis does not provide much direct
guidance for states or taxpayers, but this is hardly surprising. The Court's
minimal approach was entirely consistent with how state courts had
decided economic-nexus cases over the last two decades. It was also
consistent with the Roberts Court's general approach of crafting its
decisions as narrowly as possible. 68 Nevertheless, states and taxpayers can
glean some guidance by looking at the origin of the physical-presence
rule, the facts at issue in Wayfair, and the nature of the state income tax.
First, we know that the Quill and NationalBellas Hess Courts imposed
the physical-presence rule largely due to the perceived compliance
69
burdens associated with sales tax collections, and that those burdens are
largely attributable to the large number of local jurisdictions with

63.

Gamage & Heckman, supra note 2.

64.
65.

Wavfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099.
Id. at 2099.

66.
Id. Earlier in the Court's opinion, it discussed "virtual presences" in the context of "virtual
showrooms," presumably a website. Id. at 2095.
67.
See Thimmesch, supra note 34, at 173-81 (discussing how state courts have defined economic
nexus).
68.
See Perry L. Moriearty, Implementing Proportionality, 50 U.C. DAVIs. L. REv. 961, 1031
(2017) (commenting on judicial minimalism under the Roberts Court).
69.
See Gamage & Heckman, supra note 2, at 493-94.
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consumption-tax authority and the differences in tax bases among
jurisdictions. In addition, notwithstanding the continued existence of those
compliance costs, the Wayfair Court found that South Dakota's sales
thresholds were high enough to satisfy the nexus requirement in a postQuill world.7 0 This means that $100,001 of sales or 200 transactions is
enough of an economic connection to justify the compliance costs
associated with use-tax collections.
How does the compliance cost of state corporate income taxes compare?
Certainly, there are far fewer jurisdictions that levy corporate income taxes
and they generally resemble one another, including by piggybacking on
71
the federal income tax for purposes of defining the tax base.
Of course,
the corporate income tax is likely a more complicated tax for many
72
We don't have a strong opinion as to how
taxpayers for other reasons.
this should come out except to note that states adopting factor nexus
thresholds should be confident that their tests will withstand scrutiny as
long as their thresholds do not dip unreasonably low relative to the
thresholds in Wayfair. The $500,000 threshold contained in the Multistate
Tax Commission's model law seems safe. So does Michigan's lower
$350,000 threshold. 74 It is not difficult to see that even lower thresholds
could pass constitutional muster based on Wayfair.
Not all states will want to adopt quantitative rules, and, notably, many

70.
Wayfair, 138 S.Ct. at 2099 ("Here, the nexus is clearly sufficient based on both the economic
and virtual contacts respondents have with the State. The Act applies only to sellers that deliver more
than $100,000 of goods or services into South Dakota or engage in 200 or more separate transactions
for the delivery of goods and services into the State on an annual basis.").
71.
HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 32, at 1 7.02 ("The outstanding characteristic of state corporate
net income taxes is their broad conformity to the federal corporate income tax."); see also id. at ¶
6.11[3] (asserting that "the burdens of complying with the income tax laws of various state and local
jurisdictions are less daunting that the burden of complying with the laws of the nation's 6,000 plus
sales and use tax jurisdictions").

72.

Compare Tax Comm'r of State v. MBNA America Bank, N.A., 640 S.E.2d 226, 233-34 (W. Va.

2006) (majority justifying a less exacting nexus threshold for income taxes based on the lower
compliance burdens associated with those taxes) with id. at 240 (Benjamin, J., dissenting) (arguing that
corporate income taxes are more burdensome).
73.
MULTISTATE TAX COMMISSION, FACTOR PRESENCE NEXUS STANDARD FOR BUSINESS
ACTIVITY
TAX,
Oct.
17,
2002,
http://www.mtc.gov/uploadedFiles/MultistateTaxCommission/Uniformity/Unifo
rmityProjects/A_-_Z/FactorPresenceNexusStandardBusinessActTaxes.pdf.

74.

See MICH. COMP. LAWS

§ 206.621(1)

(2012).
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states currently apply qualitative standards.75 Opining on the
constitutionality of those standards is more difficult and those standards
may be more susceptible to challenge than are bright-line rules if they do
not provide protections for smaller businesses. We would therefore
recommend that states with nexus standards adopt de minimis protections,
at least administratively, if they want to avoid challenge. States should
have little economic interest in pursuing taxpayers with very low in-state
income in any event, so establishing minimum protections for taxpayers
seems to be advisable in order to avoid costly litigation. De minimis rules
can also serve to put taxpayers on notice as to what levels of sales will
draw scrutiny and help to fight against taxpayer recalcitrance.
Of course, nexus is not the only constraint on state corporate income
taxes. States remain bound by P.L. 86-272, 76 and they apparently also
must ensure that their statutes do not run afoul of the Court's Pike v. Bruce
Church balancing test. 77 The constraints of P.L. 86-272 are familiar,
however, and it is not likely that any corporate income tax we know of
would fail Pike balancing. 78
III. SALES TAX ADMINISTRATION IN THE
POST-WA YFAIR WORLD
Above, in Parts I and II, we analyzed questions that are in a sense
directly raised by the reasoning of the Wayfair decision. However, in
addition to those sorts of questions, another set of questions arises from
contemplating how sales-and-use tax administration is likely to operate in
the post- Wayfair world.

75.
See Thimmesch, supra note 34, at 181-84.
P.L. 86-272 imposes a modified physical-presence rule for purposes of state income-tax
76.
assessments when a business is selling tangible personal property. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 381-84 (2012). It
forbids the state imposition of income taxes on businesses who do no more than solicit sales of that
property within its boundaries, but contains some additional protections when businesses use
independent contractors in the state. See id.; see also HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 32, at ¶f 6.17-

19.
77.
See supra text Section I.B.
78.
Furthermore there is an argument that the broad concept of nexus in Wavfair will narrow the
interpretation of "solicitation" in PL 86-272. See Jaye Calhoun & William J. Kollarik II, Implications
ofthe Supreme Court s HistoricDecision in Wayfair, 89 STATE TAX NOTES 125, 1 36 (2018).
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Most importantly, once states expand their sales-and-use-tax bases to
encompass large out-of-state vendors, to what extent should state
governments then be concerned about e-commerce transactions potentially
shifting to either smaller out-of-state vendors selling through marketplaces
or foreign vendors?
In this Part, we argue that state governments should apply their new
nexus standards to the major marketplaces. We also argue that states
should feel free to adopt more encompassing nexus standards without
fears that their residents will shift their purchasing to foreign vendors.

A. The Problem of E-Commerce Marketplaces
The Wayfair decision is already ushering in a new regime for interstate
sales-and-use tax transactions wherein state governments should be able to
successfully tax most transactions between in-state citizens and out-ofstate vendors. However, for this new regime to be successful, it is
absolutely critical for state governments to reach sales by small out-ofstate vendors conducted through the major marketplaces like Amazon and
eBay.
As we have discussed, there are limits to the extent to which the
Wayfair decision allows state governments to impose collection
obligations on out-of-state vendors.79 Importantly, the Court explained
that it was upholding South Dakota's law in part because that law
provided a "reasonable degree of protection" for smaller vendors by
exempting out-of-state vendors that deliver less than $100,000 of goods or
services into the state or engage in less than 200 separate transactions for
the delivery of goods or services into the State on an annual basis.80
The major marketplaces (Amazon, eBay, Google, etc.) will certainly
facilitate sales that, in the aggregate, exceed small-vendor thresholds of
this sort. But this raises the question of whether states can require these
marketplaces to collect tax on transactions between in-state consumers and
small out-of-state vendors that are themselves protected from having to

79.

See supra Part 1.

80.

Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2098.
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collect that tax. If not, then the result would be to create a substantial tax
advantage for small out-of-state vendors selling via the major
marketplaces as compared to their larger competitors. Being that there are
already a plethora of small vendors selling through these marketplaces,
and there are many more small retail vendors that could easily set up
operations to sell interstate through these marketplaces, this would likely
create major gaps in the new interstate sales and use tax regime.
Although the Wayfair decision does not specifically address
marketplaces, we see nothing in that decision that should prevent state
governments from imposing sales-and-use tax obligations on the major
marketplaces. We thus urge state governments to clearly apply their new
nexus standards to the major marketplaces.
Of course, states will have to carefully consider how they will define the
marketplaces that are subject to these new requirements. Marketplaces
come in many different forms. Some are run by companies that make sales
themselves, like Amazon. Those companies already have tax-collection
processes in place and are already subject to state tax-collection
obligations. On the other end of the spectrum are marketplaces like
Craigslist or Facebook Marketplace. Those marketplaces do not sell their
own goods, do not facilitate payments, and generally cater to sellers who
are making casual or isolated sales that are likely exempt from tax.
Somewhere in the middle of the spectrum is a marketplace like eBay,
which takes a very active role in facilitating sales and payments, has a
well-developed website that guides consumers to particular goods and
retailers, and is a platform often used for sales by businesses.
States with marketplace facilitator laws on the books have thus far
conditioned their tax-collection obligations on different factors. In
Connecticut and Pennsylvania, for example, the marketplace facilitator has
to participate, directly or indirectly, in the payment for the good." The
statutes in Washington and Alabama look at a variety of other factors that
involve the marketplace facilitator in the sale to some degree, including
the provision of fulfillment services, price setting, branding, and return
assistance, among others. 82

81.

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.

§

P.A. 18-152,

§4

(West, Westlaw through 2018 Feb. Reg Sess.); 72

PA. CONS. STAT. § 7213(c) (2018).
82.
ALA. CODE § 40-23-199.2 (Westlaw through Act 2018-579); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.

§

Taxing E-Commerce

2019]

89

We believe that states are well within their powers to require companies
like Amazon to collect tax on sales that are made using its platform. States
are also on firm footing if they want to require the collection of tax by
vendors, like eBay, that take a very active role in promoting and
facilitating sales, including by facilitating payments and returns and by
providing money-back guarantees to those who use its platform. State
power with respect to passive marketplaces like Facebook Marketplace or
Craigslist is less certain, but it seems that states have less of an interest in
pursuing those marketplaces given that many of the sales taking place on
those platforms, though certainly not all, will likely be tax exempt under
states' casual or isolated sales exemptions. We suggest that states focus
their efforts on the first two categories of marketplaces, but closely
monitor the development and evolution of other types of marketplaces.
B. The Problem OfForeignE-Commerce Vendors

There is broad consensus that the Wayfair decision about nexus also
applies to remote sellers based in foreign countries." That is, assuming a
state nexus statute passes the newish Wayfair regime, a non-US vendor
must collect and remit the sales or use tax on the same terms as a US
vendor.8 5 They have no special protection.
To be sure, imposing a use tax obligation on foreign sellers implicates
both the foreign Dormant Commerce Clause and the Import-Export
Clause.86 Nevertheless, it seems hard to imagine that any state law that
passes muster under Wayfair could offend either of these provisions. In
either case, and painting in broad strokes, the state law would only likely
82.13.010(3) (West 2017).
83.
HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 32, at 13.10[4] (noting that most states have sales-tax
exemptions for "sales by those who are not regularly engaged in the business of selling").
William Hoke, Enforceability of Wavfair Decision on Foreign Companies Unclear, 89 STATE
84.
TAX NOTES 73 (2018); Deloitte, State Tax Implications of Wayfair for Non-US Companies with US
Customers:
External
Multistate
Tax
Alert,
DELOITTE,
June
28,
2018,
https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/p
ages/tax/articles/state-tax-implications-wayfair-for-non-us-companies-with-us-customers.html.
85.
We refer to use taxes in the remainder of this essay, but it may be that states will impose their
sales taxes on foreign sales instead. As we discussed above, this may be significant, and the foreign
dimension may raise issues that have not yet been considered. See supra Section II.A (discussing
whether states will impose sales tax obligations or use tax obligations post- Wayfair).

86.

U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 2.
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fail under these provisions if state collection efforts antagonized our
trading partners in such a way that the federal government would take the
side of foreign vendors in litigation, but without Congress actually passing
a law preempting state collection efforts.8
Commentators have wisely been much more concerned about whether
and how states are going to get foreign vendors to collect use tax in the
first place.88 The consensus seems to be that enforcement might turn out
to be quite a problem, as a matter of both law and practice.89 If this
consensus is correct, then there is a further empirical question of whether
there the result will be an uneven playing field between domestic and
foreign vendors.
Let us start with the legal analysis. It is likely correct that states are not
going to have much luck getting foreign governments to enforce their use
tax collection obligations under current law.90 Some analyses seem to
imply that this is basically the end of the matter, but this is not so. A state
can surely impose a tax lien on any property that the non-collecting vendor
has in the state, for instance. For many states, such as New York with its
banks and California with its ports, this will likely be a significant aid in
enforcement.
But what if the foreign vendor does not have property within the state?
Again, the suggestion seems to be that if there is no property within the
state, then the state is out of luck, but that too is incorrect. If a state takes
the trouble of getting its tax lien reduced to a judgment in its own courts
and then follows the procedures of the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments Act, 9' then the state can enforce its judgments in the courts of

87.

As happened in Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979), but not

Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983). See also Leanne M. Wilson,
The Fate of the Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause After Garamendi and Crosby, 107 COLUM. L.
REV. 746 (2007) (arguing that the key test involves a preemption analysis in light of non-tax cases
decided after Container).
88.
See Hoke, supra note 84. See also Ryan Prete, Foreign Sellers Likely Sqfe from State Online
Tax Frenzy Post-Wayfair, BLOOMBERG TAX, July 12, 2018.
See, e.g., Garry G. Fujita, A Court Upholds Quill What's Next?, 86 STATE TAX NOTES 741
89.

(2017); William Hoke, supra note 84; Brian J. Kirkell & Mo Bell-Jacobs, E-FlightRisk? Wayfair and
&

the Revenue Rule, 89 STATE TAX NOTES 551 (2018).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 483 (AM. LAW INST. 1987); Kirkell
90.
Jacobs, supra note 89. This is not to say that governments could not and should not change this state of

affairs. William S. Dodge, Breaking the Public Law Taboo, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 161 (2002).
91.

See generally C. Joseph Lennihan, Cross-Border Collection of State Tax Assessments: A
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another state. Forms of this Act have been passed in forty-nine states.
In other words, Ohio can collect from a foreign vendor by enforcing its
judgment against the funds it holds in a New York bank.
To be sure, this process could be burdensome and apparently states do
not typically go to this much trouble, but they sometimes do, 94 and, in any
event, they would have enormous incentive to do so if the feared shift to
foreign vendors were to actually occur. In short, we think that states will
have considerable enforcement power if the feared shift to foreign vendors
is significant enough to warrant such an effort.
As an empirical matter, we don't expect there to be a need for an
enormous number of cross-state enforcement actions. We say this for
several reasons beyond our legal analysis as to state power. First, as
discussed previously, states almost certainly can and should impose
collection obligations on major marketplaces like Amazon and eBay. 95
This should greatly reduce the scope for foreign vendors to sell to in-state
Second, business-tocustomers while evading collection obligations.
business use-tax compliance rates are rather high,96 and so we are only
concerned with direct sales to consumers. Third, the shift of sales to
smaller, foreign vendors does not present any unique enforcement problem
for states given the legal and administrative need for small-seller
exemptions. It is just the case that it will always be difficult for states to

Primer, 19 J. MULTISTATE TAX'N & INCENTIVES, Sept. 2009, at 8.
The key Supreme Court decision establishing that states must enforce each other judgments
92.

under the Full Faith and Credit Clause is Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935).
Note that this very case was about a county in Wisconsin attempting to enforce a tax judgment in

Illinois. Id. at 269.
93.
See Lennihan supra note 91; see also Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, UNIFORM LAWS
COMMIssIoN,
http://www.uniformIaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Enforcement%/20Of/20Foreign%20Judgme

nts%20Act. (last visited Sept. 22, 2018).
94.

For instance, there are a number of cases involving New York trying to enforce judgments in

Florida. See, e.g., N. Y. State Comm'r of Taxation & Fin. v. Hayward, 902 So. 2d 309, 310 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2005). For an example of a local government successfully enforcing a judgment see City of

Philadelphia v. Austin, 429 A.2d 568, 569 (N.J. 1981). For examples of businesses using the act to
collect from other businesses see Sheldon H. Laskin, The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: A
Government Service Designed to Benefit Nonresidents, 47 STATE TAX NOTES 41 (2008).
95.
See supra Part Il.A.
See, e.g., California State Board of Equalization, Revenue Estimate: Electronic Commerce and
96.
Mail OrderSales, Rev. 8/13 (2013) at 9 ("Through one means or another BOE believes that registered
sales and use tax is paid on 90 percent of California taxable B-to-B electronic commerce").
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collect use tax on sales made by smaller vendors, regardless of where they
are located.
Fourth, the particular form of good arguably most susceptible to evasion
- digital goods - does not strike us as relatively problematic for states.
This is because, though growing in importance, digital goods are still only
a small slice of the market.97 Also, many common business-to-consumer
digital goods are sold through major platforms that can clearly be targeted
for enforcement; think of the Apple App Store, Google Play, Netflix or
Amazon Prime video. And if a foreign vendor attempted to operate
independently of these platforms, it would still need to establish a payment
mechanism to collect revenues from US customers. Any sizeable foreign
firm would likely want to access the US capital markets, creating another
opportunity for states to collect.
Fifth, though the potential price advantage from not collecting the use
tax is real and substantial, we think that many of the commentators
concerned about "e-flight" exaggerate the cost of use tax compliance in
the same way that many remote vendors did pre-Wayfair. Not only would
the compliance costs for a foreign vendor with sales above the thresholds
set by the states likely face a small cost relative to the value of its sales,
but these compliance cost will not likely stand out relative to the
compliance costs associated with other consumption taxes.
For instance, consider a Canadian vendor. At the national level, Canada
has a credit-invoice Value Added Tax (VAT) that is, on its own, at least as
complex as any state's retail sales tax. 98 If the Canadian vendor sells
abroad it already must cope with Border Tax Adjustments (BTAs) because
basically every other country on earth has a VAT, and BTAs are a
standard part of VATs. Once in the new jurisdiction, the foreign vendor
will again need to deal with a VAT assuming it is making sales in the

97.
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, E-STATs 2016: MEASURING THE ELECTRONIC ECONOMY, May 24, 2018,
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2018/econ/el6-estats.pdf
(reporting
that e-commerce was 8% of total sales in 2016).
98.
Likely more so. See, e.g., Sebastian Eichfelder & Frangois Vaillancourt, Tax compliance costs:
A review of cost burdens and cost structures 28 (ARQUS, Working Paper No. 178, 2014) ("VAT
seems
to
be
significantly
more
costly
than
more
simple
sales
taxes"),
http://www.arqus.info/mobile/paper/arqu
s_178.pdf. Note that many of the Canadian provinces also have their own consumption taxes. On the
complicated system in Canada generally see Richard M. Bird & Pierre-Pascal Gendron, Sales Taxes in

Canada: The GST-JIST-QST-RST "System", 63 TAX L. REV. 517 (2010).
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foreign country itself.
Furthermore, and sixth, there is a significant body of literature to the
effect that businesses generally want to comply with the law. This is not
just a matter of altruism, but good sense for the business and for the
individual managers.'" Simply not paying a large state tax liability will
show up on financial statements, for example, and will hover over any
future plans to operate in the United States.1o1 It seems improbable to us
that many large vendors are likely just to ignore the laws of states in which
they make substantial sales. Remember that in the pre-Wayfair world, big
businesses like Wayfair were complying with current law when not
remitting the use tax. In the new post- Wayfair world, this will no longer
be the case.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, if a shift to foreign sellers
ultimately ends up being a large problem, despite all our reasons to think
this will not be the case, then we would expect Congress to intervene on
the side of the states. After all, this would be a situation where all US
domestic vendors would be at a disadvantage - we would not have the
same issue as related to the Quill rule where the interests of different states
diverged based on whether or not they had a sales tax.
For all of these reasons, we do not expect that foreign sellers will create
any major gaps in the new post- Wayfair sales-and-use-tax enforcement
regime. State governments should not let any fears about in-state citizens
shifting to purchasing from foreign vendors stand in the way of efforts to
apply more encompassing nexus standards for imposing collection
obligations on out-of-state vendors.
CONCLUSION
In this essay, we have analyzed a number of key questions that arise
from the Wayfair decision. Certainly, other questions will arise beyond
those we have considered here; we make no claims to having

99.
Foreign countries generally have de minimis rules that protect smaller vendors from VAT
obligations, but the threshold amounts vary considerably. Emily Ann Satterthwaite, On the Threshold:
Smallness and the Value Added Tax, 9 COLUM. TAX L.J. 177, 194-95 (2018).
100. See Wei Cui, Taxation Without Information: The Institutional Foundations of Modern Tax
Collection, 20 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 93 (2018).
101. Kirkell and Jacobs make this point. See Kirkell & Jacobs, supra note 87.
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comprehensively analyzed all aspects of the decision. Instead, we
conclude by repeating our list of the specific policy suggestions we offer,
that state governments should consider: (1) simplifying their sales-anduse-tax systems, along with potentially joining the Streamlined Sales and
Use Tax Agreement ("SSUTA") if they have not already done so, (2)
offering full and adequate reimbursement for compliance costs, especially
for smaller vendors, (3) offering free compliance software and immunity
for vendors who properly rely on such software, (4) either ensuring that
their sales-and-use-tax statutes impose substantive tax liabilities in the
same manner as does South Dakota's statute or else continuing their
reliance on the historic formalism by requiring remote vendors to collect
and remit use taxes rather than sales taxes, (5) ensuring that any attempts
to expand corporate income tax nexus based on the Wavfair decision
incorporate de minimis thresholds in a similar manner as our
recommendations for expanding sales-and-use tax nexus, (6) applying
their new sales-and-use-tax nexus standards to the major marketplaces in
addition to vendors selling directly, and (7) taking steps to alleviate
possible concerns about in-state citizens shifting to purchasing from
foreign vendors.

